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One of the alleged benefits of the recent global movement to strengthen intellectual 
property rights (IPR) is that such reforms accelerate transfers of technology between 
countries.  This paper examines how technology transfer among U.S. multinational firms 
changes in response to a series of IPR reforms undertaken by 12 countries over the 1982-
99 period.  Analysis of detailed firm-level data reveals that royalty payments for 
intangibles transferred to affiliates increase at the time of reforms, as do affiliate research 
and development (R&D) expenditures and total levels of foreign patent applications.  
Increases in royalty payments and R&D expenditures are more than 20% larger among 
affiliates of parent companies that use U.S. patents more extensively prior to reform and 
therefore are expected to value IPR reform most. 
 
 
Lee G. Branstetter 
Columbia Business School and NBER 
Uris 815 
3022 Broadway 
New York, NY 10027 




Columbia Business School and NBER 
Uris 823 
3022 Broadway 
New York, NY 10027 
TEL  212-854-9157 
rf250@columbia.edu 
 
C. Fritz Foley 
University of Michigan Business School 
701 Tappan St. 
Ann Arbor, MI 48109 
TEL (734) 763-1436 
ffoley@umich.eduNon-technical summary 
 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) requires a 
number of countries to strengthen their patent and other intellectual property rights (IPR) systems.  Even 
though policy makers have committed to significant reforms, the implementation of this agreement 
remains contentious.  On one side, many policymakers believe that this mandated policy change will 
work against their national economic interests, transferring rents to multinational corporate patent 
holders headquartered in the world’s most advanced countries, especially the United States.  Advocates 
for strong IPR counter that strengthening IPR will accelerate the transfer of technology between 
countries, ensuring a relatively equal distribution of gains from this policy change.   
This paper uses affiliate-level data on U.S. multinational firms and aggregate patent data to test if 
legal reforms that strengthen IPR increase the transfer of technology by multinationals to reforming 
countries.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a number of countries undertook reforms of their 
intellectual property systems.  Analysis of data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s survey of U.S. 
multinational firms reveals evidence of an increase in technology transfer from parent firms to affiliates 
located in IPR-reforming countries.  More precisely, royalty payments for the use or sale of intangible 
assets made by affiliates to parent firms increase in the wake of strengthened IPR regimes.  This increase 
is concentrated among the affiliates of firms that make more extensive use of U.S. patents prior to the 
reforms.  In contrast, the evidence of an increase in technology licensing to unaffiliated parties is weaker 
and is concentrated in those firms that did not possess affiliates in the reforming countries prior to the 
implementation of reforms. 
  The view that IPR reform results in an increase in technology transfer among U.S. multinationals 
is strengthened by the fact that R&D spending by affiliates – traditionally viewed as a complement to 
technology imports from the parent – increases after IPR reform.  Examination of international trends in 
patent applications also suggests that at least one component of the observable increase in licensing flows 
is associated with the introduction of new technology in the wake of patent reform.  Both the level and 
rate of change of nonresident patenting increase in the post-reform period.  Consistent with earlier work, 
the results indicate no corresponding reaction in resident patent filings.  Interviews with practitioners 
confirm that the strength of the local IPR regime is one of the critical factors reviewed by U.S.-based 
multinationals in determining the scope and level of local affiliate operations.  Collectively, our results 
provide evidence that improvements in IPR result in real increases in technology transfers by 
multinational enterprises.  
    1
 
1. Introduction 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
requires a number of countries to strengthen their patent and other intellectual property 
rights (IPR) systems.
2  Even though policymakers have committed to significant reforms, 
the implementation of this agreement remains contentious.  On one side, many 
policymakers believe that this mandated policy change will work against their national 
economic interests, transferring rents to multinational corporate patent holders 
headquartered in the world’s most advanced countries, especially the United States.
3  
Advocates for strong IPR counter that strengthening IPR will induce more innovation, 
thereby fostering more rapid economic growth.  These advocates also believe that a 
strengthening of IPR will accelerate the transfer of technology between countries, 
ensuring a relatively equal distribution of gains from this policy change.   
Despite this heated policy debate, the economics literature has only started to 
confront alternative viewpoints with facts.  While theoretical work provides valuable 
frameworks that detail the circumstances under which IPR enhances and reduces welfare, 
many hypothesized effects of IPR have not been held up to empirical scrutiny.  This 
paper uses affiliate-level data on U.S. multinational firms and aggregate patent data to 
test whether legal reforms that strengthen IPR increase the transfer of technology by 
multinationals to reforming countries.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a number of 
countries undertook reforms of their intellectual property systems.  Analysis of data from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s survey of U.S. multinational firms reveals evidence 
                                                 
2   Implementation of the terms of this agreement is ongoing.  Some developing countries have until 2016 
to fully comply. 
3   For a more academic treatment of some of these claims see Lanjouw (1997) and McCalman (2001).    2
of an increase in technology transfer from parent firms to affiliates located in IPR-
reforming countries.  More precisely, royalty payments for the use or sale of intangible 
assets made by affiliates to parent firms increase in the wake of strengthened IPR 
regimes.  This increase is concentrated among the affiliates of firms that make more 
extensive use of U.S. patents prior to the reforms.  In contrast, the evidence of an increase 
in technology licensing to unaffiliated parties is weaker and is concentrated in those firms 
that did not possess affiliates in the reforming countries prior to the implementation of 
reforms. 
  The view that IPR reform results in an increase in technology transfer among U.S. 
multinationals is strengthened by the fact that research and development (R&D) spending 
by affiliates – traditionally viewed as a complement to technology imports from the 
parent – increases after IPR reform.  Examination of international trends in patent 
applications also suggests that at least one component of the observable increase in 
licensing flows is associated with the introduction of new technology in the wake of 
patent reform.  Both the level and rate of change of nonresident patenting increase in the 
post-reform period.  Consistent with earlier work, the results indicate no corresponding 
reaction in resident patent filings.  Interviews with practitioners confirm that the strength 
of the local IPR regime is one of the critical factors reviewed by U.S.-based 
multinationals in determining the scope and level of local affiliate operations.  
Collectively, our results provide evidence that improvements in IPR result in real 
increases in technology transfers by multinational enterprises.  
  The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview 
of the extant literature on IPR and international economic activity and puts forth the    3
hypotheses we test.  Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 discusses the results.  
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Intellectual Property Rights and Technology Transfers 
2.1 Prior Literature 
Previous work on the role of IPR in promoting innovation and growth in the 
global economy falls into three main categories: studies of the responsiveness of 
domestic innovation to IPR, studies of the impact of changing IPR in the developing 
world on global welfare, and studies of the responsiveness of types of international 
economic activity like trade or foreign direct investment (FDI) to IPR. 
The first of these streams of research is based largely in the industrial 
organization literature and examines the role of IPR in promoting innovation.  This work 
generally considers reactions to specific changes in the IPR regime of a single country 
(see, for example, Scherer and Weisburst (1995); Bessen and Maskin (2000); or 
Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001)).  A large number of these studies find that a 
strengthening of IPR results in little or no measured increase in domestic innovation.
4 
Lerner (2001, 2002) avoids criticisms related to the generality of single country 
studies by analyzing the impact of all significant patent reforms over the last 150 years in 
a sample of 60 countries.  His findings confirm that reforms have few positive effects on 
patent applications by entities based in the country undertaking the policy change.  
Although Lerner’s work does not consider the effects of reforms on technology transfer, 
he finds that foreign applicants do respond to these changes by increasing their patenting 
                                                 
4   Cockburn and Lanjouw (2001) attempt to discern the impact of TRIPs on the composition of 
pharmaceutical research and find, at best, mixed evidence of a modest impact.    4
after reforms.
5  This finding suggests that one of the primary mechanisms by which 
economies may benefit from IPR reform is through obtaining larger technology flows 
from multinationals, the issue that we examine in this paper.   
A second stream of research, most of it theoretical, has sought to examine the 
global welfare implications of patent reform in developing countries.  The pioneering 
work of Helpman (1993) demonstrated that strengthening IPR could actually lower 
global welfare.  In Helpman’s framework, human resources in the North are divided 
between generating new products (innovation) and the manufacture of existing products 
(production).  Over time, the production of mature products is transferred to Southern 
firms through a process of imitation of Northern products.   By raising the costs of 
Southern imitation, stronger IPR in the South slows down this process of transfer of 
production to the South.  Because goods continue to be produced in the North, the wage 
of Northern labor is bid up – and this raises the cost of R&D, slowing the rate at which 
new products are generated.  Because the pace of innovation is reduced, global welfare 
declines. 
Lai (1998) introduced the possibility of foreign direct investment into a model 
similar to that of Helpman (1993).
6  Lai showed that, in a model with FDI, stronger IPR 
could actually accelerate the transfer of production to the South – but the means of this 
transfer would be through FDI rather than imitation by indigenous Southern firms.  Glass 
and Saggi (2002) challenge Lai’s predictions.  In their model, the global welfare impact 
                                                 
5   Related recent theoretical work by Grossman and Lai (2002) emphasizes that in a global economy, the 
strengthening of a domestic patent system may have little impact.  This is particularly true if the world’s 
largest economies already have strong patent systems under which firms based in developing countries can 
apply for patent protection.  Going further, Grossman and Lai demonstrate that international harmonization 
of patent protection is neither necessary nor sufficient for global efficiency. 
6  In Helpman’s original formulation, the only way production of a good was transferred to the South was 
through imitation by indigenous Southern firms.      5
of IPR strengthening in the South also depends on its impact on FDI.  They show a range 
of conditions and parameter values under which stronger IPR in the South reduces FDI, 
and they conclude that the global welfare impact of stronger IPR could still be negative.  
Therefore, empirical facts concerning the effects of IPR reform on transfers of 
technology from multinationals are crucial to the assessment of the welfare consequences 
of reform.  We analyze these effects.  It is worth noting that we distinguish between 
deliberate technology transfers by firms and other forms of technological spillovers and 
focus on the former.
7 
Empirical work that directly addresses the welfare impact of changes in IPR has 
lagged behind theory.  Perhaps the best-known empirical work to date that explicitly 
seeks to measure welfare impact is that of McCalman.  Building on the work of Eaton 
and Kortum (1996), McCalman (2001) estimates a structural model of innovation and 
technology transfer to infer the implications of the TRIPs agreement.  His calculations 
suggest that patent harmonization would result in large transfers between countries and in 
particularly large benefits for the U.S.  As he acknowledges, this study does not include 
any accounting of the benefits that might accrue from a higher rate of innovation, nor 
does it factor in the potential for an acceleration of technology transfer in response to a 
strengthening of IPR.   
Finally, there is a literature that analyzes the cross-sectional relationship between 
IPR and measures of international trade and investment.  In looking at bilateral trade 
patterns, Maskus and Penubarti (1995) found a strong positive effect of IPR on imports.  
Smith (1999) reports results that are consistent with a role for IPR in encouraging U.S. 
exports.    
                                                 
7 For recent work on other forms of technological spillovers, see Keller (2002) and Branstetter (2000).    6
The evidence of the effect of IPR on FDI is less clear.  Maskus and Eby-Konan 
(1994) find no effect of IPR measures on FDI.  Maskus (1998), however, points out that 
studies that consider FDI in isolation may not be conclusive because investment is only 
one part of the broader set of decisions that a multinational firm makes in entering a 
market.  He reports regressions that are consistent with a positive effect of IPR on FDI, 
but only for more developed countries.
8  In principle, multinationals can transfer 
technology to developing countries even without undertaking FDI.  Yang and Maskus 
(2000) examine the effect of improved IPR regimes on arm’s length licensing by U.S. 
Multinational Enterprise’s (MNE) and report a strong positive relationship.
9 
While these papers are suggestive of some interesting patterns, they all suffer 
from the usual problems that affect cross-country regressions.  The measures of IPR 
utilized do not generally take into account the effectiveness of enforcement, they are 
highly correlated with other important country characteristics, and they have limited 
time-series variation.  Since FDI data are typically not disaggregated, even by industry, it 
has also not been possible to look at the impact of IPR reform on the composition of 
multinational activity.
10  The data and methodology employed in our paper allow for a 
more convincing examination of the impact of IPR on technology transfers. 
 
                                                 
8  Lee and Mansfield (1996) also study the impact of IPR on FDI, taking a cross-sectional approach. 
9 Smith (2001) also examines the impact of IPR on licensing and FDI, obtaining results with the licensing 
variable that are consistent with those of Yang and Maskus. 
10  One recent exception is Smarzynska (2000), who examines the composition of FDI in Eastern Europe in 
the 1990s and relates this composition to differences across countries in IPR regimes.  Because this study 
focuses on a small number of countries in a single region of the developing world, natural questions arise 
about the extent to which these findings can be generalized outside their regional context. 
    7
2.2 Hypotheses and Empirical Specifications 
One of the potential benefits of stronger intellectual property rights is that such 
protections may induce foreign firms to produce and sell technologically advanced goods 
in the host country.  The previous literature, as well as basic intuition, suggests that if IPR 
regime shifts have a material impact on true intellectual property protection, then there 
should be an increase in the value of technology flows from parents to affiliates following 
regime changes.  This hypothesis is formally derived in a simple theoretical model laid 
out in Appendix B and examined with regressions of the following form: 
(1)   
ilt il jt jt
ilt jt it jt t il ilt
Pat R R
A H P y Transfer
ε β β
β β β β α α α
+ +
+ + + + + + + =
* 5 4
3 2 1 0 0  
where l indexes the individual affiliate, i the affiliate’s parent firm, j the affiliate’s host 
country, and t the year.  The dependent variable measures the volume of intrafirm royalty 
payments for intangible assets – the proxy for technology transfer.  The key variable of 
interest is Rjt, the post reform dummy variable, equal to one in the year of and years 
following patent reform in country j.
11  The specification includes time-invariant fixed 
effects for the affiliate ( il α ), year fixed effects for the entire sample ( t α ), and country-
specific time trends.
12  As a consequence, identification of the effect of reforms comes 
from differences in the timing of reforms. 
A number of other controls are also included in the specification.  Pit is a vector of 
time-varying characteristics of the parent firm, including measures of size and R&D 
                                                 
11   As a robustness check, we also estimated a version of (1) in which patent reform was parameterized as a 
series of dummy variables corresponding to lags of set length before and after patent reform.  These results 
suggest no statistically significant change prior to reform, but a steady, statistically significant increase in 
licensing after reform. 
12  To be precise, we include dummy variables for each affiliate-parent pair.  Some affiliates are sold to 
other multinationals over our sample period.  When an affiliate is acquired by a new parent, we effectively 
treat it as a different affiliate.  This treatment of the data precludes the need for separate parent firm fixed 
effects.    8
investment.  These variables control for the natural tendency for technology transfers 
from a parent to change as these state variables change over time.  Hjt is a set of time-
varying characteristics of the host country, including the log of GDP per capita and an 
indicator of whether the host country imposes restrictions on inward FDI.  Also among 
the country level controls are two tax variables that capture how tax considerations affect 
the incentives of firms in setting the value of intangibles.  These are the difference 
between the host country corporate income tax rate and the U.S. corporate income tax 
rate and the withholding tax rate charged on royalty payments by the host country.
13  
Finally, Ailt is a vector of time-varying characteristics of individual affiliates, including 
the log of affiliate sales.
14 
  The increase in the value of technology flows from parent firms to affiliates 
should be largest for firms that value patent protection the most.  In order to study the 
differential effects of patent reforms across firms, affiliates are split into two groups 
according to the extent to which parents of affiliates use U.S. patents prior to the reform.  
Those affiliates of parents that, over the four years prior to a particular reform, average at 
least as many U.S. patent applications as the parent of the median affiliate in the 
reforming country over the same period are assigned a high patent use dummy, Patil, 
equal to one.  For other affiliates that have parents that can be matched to the NBER 
                                                 
13 Inclusion of variables on tax rates enables us to control, at least in part, for the potential impact of 
transfer pricing on our measures of technology transfer.  Measures of international economic activity 
generally find that distance is an important factor in explaining the distribution of trade and investment 
across countries, but geographic distance between the United States and each host country will be absorbed 
into the host country dummy variable.  
14 We recognize that some of the regressors are potentially endogenous, but our aim here is not to estimate 
structural coefficients but rather to obtain a general sense of how measures of affiliate performance are 
conditionally correlated with IPR reform.  Regressors that may pose a problem are excluded from some 
specifications.      9
patent database, Patil equals zero.
15  This dummy variable is interacted with the post 
reform dummy variable.  
Changes in the value of licensing payments could reflect changes in the volume of 
technology transferred or merely changes in the price charged for that technology.  
Analyzing changes in the R&D expenditures of affiliates is helpful in distinguishing 
between these two possibilities.  There is a considerable body of work that details the 
relationship between affiliate and parent-firm R&D.
16  It is clear that U.S.-based 
multinationals undertake basic and applied research abroad, as well as product 
development.  However, to the extent that it is done outside the United States, research 
tends to be concentrated in other developed countries, such as Germany, where the local 
scientific and engineering community is highly accomplished and the infrastructure for 
frontier research is well-developed.  R&D conducted by affiliates in developing 
countries, which account for most of the countries in our sample, tends to be focused on 
the modification of parent firm technology for local markets.
17  The literature review 
presented in Kuemmerle (1999) makes the point that a number of studies suggest that the 
co-location of R&D with foreign manufacturing facilitates the “transfer of knowledge 
and prototypes from the firm’s home location to actual manufacturing.”
18  Viewed in this 
light, affiliate R&D and technology transfers from the parent can be considered 
complements.   Given this complementary relationship, IPR reform should also prompt 
an increase in R&D spending.  
                                                 
15 Alternative ways of specifying Patil yield similar results.  A four year window is used in these 
calculations because the sample begins in 1982 and the first reform occurs in 1986. 
16   For an early study on this topic, see Mansfield, Teece, and Romeo (1979).  Kuemmerle (1999) provides 
an excellent survey of the literature as of 1999. 
17   Mansfield, Teece, and Romeo (1979) were perhaps the first scholars to make this observation. 
18   Studies by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1990), Hakanson (1990), Vernon (1966), Fors (1997), Clark and 
Fujimoto (1991), Hayes and Wheelwright (1988), Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), and von Hippel (1988) 
generally support this view.      10
To test if this is the case, variations of the basic specification are used to analyze 
affiliate R&D.  These specifications take the form: 
(2) 
ilt il jt
jt ilt jt it jt t il ilt
Pat R
R A H P y D R
ε β
β β β β β α α α
+




4 3 2 1 0 0
 
The dependent variable measures the level of R&D spending conducted by affiliate l of 
parent i in year t.  The right hand side variables remain as they were in specification (1). 
Changes in technology transfer are not constrained to take place between parents 
and their affiliates.  Firms also license intangible assets to arm’s length parties.  The prior 
literature, intuition, and the formal model laid out in Appendix B predict that this type of 
licensing may also increase after IPR reform.  Equation (1) above can be slightly altered 
to study these flows: 
(3)   
ijt jt jt jt t ij ijt R H y License ε β β β α α α + + + + + + = 2 1 0 0  
Here, the dependent variable measures royalty payments received by parent firm i from 
unaffiliated parties in country j in year t.  Unfortunately, the surveys that collect these 
data do not record detailed information on the characteristics of licensee or licensor firms.  
As a result, firm/country fixed effects ( ij α ) take the place of affiliate fixed effects, and it 
is not possible to control for characteristics of firms that pay or receive licensing fees.  
Other right hand side variables include a vector of host country characteristics (Hjt) , and 
host-country specific time trends (yjt). 
If multinationals do change the volume of technology transferred in a sustained 
manner and if these changes are a consequence of stronger IPR, then this should be 
reflected in the data on foreign patenting in reforming countries.  In the absence of a truly 
international patent system, firms have to seek patent grants in each country in which    11
they operate.  Obtaining these patent grants is not costless.  One could view obtaining a 
patent grant as equivalent to purchasing an option to deploy a particular technology with 
local legal protection.  A foreign multinational has little incentive to go through the time 
and trouble of preparing and filing patent applications in a jurisdiction where patent 
rights are weak.
19  When IPR reform occurs and patent laws are strengthened, the 
multinational may have the incentive to file patents for all of the technologies currently 
employed in the jurisdiction.  This would imply a temporary increase in foreign patent 
filing that would eventually fall off as firms completed protecting the portfolio of 
technologies currently being used in the country in question.
20  However, multinationals 
may be induced by the patent regime changes to transfer new technologies into the 
jurisdiction.  This predicts not only a one-time shift in the level of patent filings but also 
increased growth in foreign patenting over time in the reformed jurisdictions after 
reforms.   
Specifications that test these predictions take the form: 
(4)  jt jt jt jt jt jt t j jt y R R H y Patent ε β β β β α α α + + + + + + + = * 3 2 1 0 0  
Here the dependent variable measures the number of patents filed by domestic or foreign 
applicants in country j in year t.  We estimate (4) separately for domestic and foreign 
patenting in the countries that underwent IPR reform.  Patent applications in year t are a 
function of country ( j α ) and year ( t α ) fixed effects as well as host country 
                                                 
19   Interviews with multinational managers confirmed the historically selective nature of U.S. firms’ 
foreign patenting. 
20   Most countries require inventors to seek local patent protection for their inventions within one year of 
filing a patent in any country – otherwise, the inventor forfeits the possibility of patent protection in that 
country.  In theory, firms could circumvent this restriction by slightly altering the technical contents of their 
patent applications, effectively presenting applications for “old” technology as if it were new.  
Conversations with multinational IPR managers suggested that, while this sometimes happens, it is difficult 
to do this in practice when the local patent system is competently and professionally managed.      12
characteristics (Hjt).  This specification allows patent reform to affect not only the level of 
patenting but also its growth rate over time, which is reflected in the inclusion of an 
interaction term of the reform dummy and the time trend.   
 
3. Data Sources 
3.1 Data from BEA Surveys 
Data on U.S. multinational firms comes from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) annual Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad and the quarterly 
Balance of Payments Survey.
21  The survey forms concerning MNE activity capture 
extensive information on measures of parent and affiliate operating activity like levels of 
sales and R&D expenditures.  MNEs must also report the value of royalties paid by 
affiliates to parents for the sale or use of intangible property.  American tax law requires 
that foreign affiliates make these payments.  The reported figures on the value of 
intangible property transferred include an amalgam of technology licensing fees, 
franchise fees, fees for the use of trademarks, etc.  However, the aggregate data indicate 
that intangible property transfers are overwhelmingly dominated by licensing of 
industrial products and processes.
22   
Depending on the particular circumstances, firms may have an incentive to 
misrepresent the value of a technology transfer to avoid taxes even though they are 
                                                 
21 The forms firms are required to complete vary depending on the year, size of the affiliate, and U.S. 
parent’s ownership stake.  The most extensive data are collected in benchmark years – 1982, 1989, 1994, 
1999.  BEA uses reported data to estimate universe totals when surveys cover only larger affiliates or when 
only certain affiliates provide information on particular survey forms.  To avoid working with estimated 
data, only affiliates required to provide all the information associated with a particular analysis are 
considered in this paper.  Additional information on the BEA data can be found in Mataloni (1995). 
22 Furthermore, in each manufacturing industry except food manufacturing, this kind of licensing accounts 
for between 80% and 99% of total royalty payments from affiliates to parents.  Even in food 
manufacturing, technology licensing accounts for more than 50% of the total.    13
supposed to apply a fair market price.  Although governments are aware of these 
incentives and try to use their enforcement powers to ensure that royalties do not deviate 
from reasonable values, Hines (1995) and Grubert (1998) do find evidence of tax effects 
on reporting.  Fortunately, these papers indicate that host country income tax rates and 
withholding tax rates can be used to control for the effects of tax incentives on reported 
intrafirm royalties.
23   
BEA also collects data on royalty payments made by arm’s length foreigners to 
U.S. firms on the Annual Survey of Royalties, License Fees, and Other Receipts and 
Payments for Intangible Rights Between U.S. and Unaffiliated Foreign Persons.  A 
sample covering 1987 forward is drawn from the results of this survey.  Since these 
payments are between unrelated parties, they are not subject to concerns about 
manipulation for tax purposes.  A large fraction of firms that file responses in this survey 
are also multinational firms that respond to the Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, 
thus providing firm level coverage of technology transfers to both affiliated and 
unaffiliated parties in individual countries through time. 
Table I displays descriptive statistics for the benchmark years in which BEA 
collected the most extensive data on U.S. foreign affiliates.  The sample includes firms 
that were active in countries that undertook the IPR regime changes described below.  In 
the most recent benchmark year, 1999, the sample includes more than 5,000 affiliates of 
more than 1,000 parent companies.   
                                                 
23  Even when multinationals do not deliberately misrepresent the value of technology transfers for tax-
related reasons, one still may doubt the extent to which the recorded licensing payments reflect the full 
economic value of technology provided by the parent to the affiliate.  This is particularly true when there is 
no well-developed external market for the technology.  However, parent reporting does not pose a problem 
for our econometric inference as long as recorded payments consistently misestimate the full value of 
technology transferred.      14
 
3.2 Data from Other Sources 
A number of other databases are used to augment the information on U.S. firms in 
the BEA data.  In order to obtain information on parent firm R&D expenditures in years 
in which this item was not captured in BEA surveys, the BEA data on publicly traded 
parents is linked to COMPUSTAT using employee identification numbers.  Parent firm 
data is also linked to data on patenting activity captured in the NBER patent citation 
database.
24   This comprehensive database covers all patents granted by the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (U.S. PTO) throughout the 1982-1999 sample period.  These data 
provide a rich picture of the evolving technological trajectories of parent firms and are 
used to test if patent reforms have larger effects for firms that make more extensive use of 
the U.S. patent system prior to the reforms. 
Data on patent filings in the countries that underwent patent reform provide 
additional information on the level of technology being transferred.  Data on patent 
applications, broken down by nationality of applicant (foreign vs. domestic), are available 
from the World Intellectual Property Rights Organization (WIPO).  If patents provide 
little or no protection in a country, there is little incentive to patent.  If multinationals 
respond to an IPR reform that substantially strengthens patent rights by increasing the 
volume of technology being transferred (rather than merely increasing the price of 
technology that has already been introduced to the market in question), then this should 
be reflected in an increase in both the level and the growth rate of total patent 
                                                 
24 This comprehensive data set on U.S. patents is documented in Hall et. al. (2001).  Linking these data to 
BEA data requires the use of a mapping between the assignee codes used by the U.S. PTO to identify 
patent applicants and the CUSIP identifier codes used by the COMPUSTAT database created for all firms 
in the 1989 COMPUSTAT data.    15
applications by foreign entities.  The analysis examines trends in domestic and foreign 
patent applications over the 1982-1999 period.  Descriptive statistics of patent application 
counts are provided in Table I, as are descriptive statistics for other variables that are 
used in the regression analysis that follows. 
Finally, information on the timing and content of IPR regime changes come from 
a number of sources.  Our starting point was the complete set of significant patent 
reforms identified by Maskus (2000).  Information on the details of individual reforms 
was obtained from Ryan (1998), Uphoff (1990), and Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001), 
and various reports published by the patent agencies.  We also undertook a series of 
interviews with multinational managers, legal experts on intellectual property rights 
based in some of the reforming countries, and international IPR consultants, in order to 
understand better the substance of the reforms and to confirm their timing.
25  Table II 
displays the list of patent reforms considered in the analysis that follows, and Appendix 
A provides additional details about these reforms.  This is not a complete or exhaustive 
list of IPR regime changes that occurred over our sample period.  For instance, some 
countries undertook reforms of their copyright laws in ways that impacted the computer 
software and entertainment industries – these are not studied in the current paper.




4.1 Technology Transfer to Affiliates  
  To provide a general sense of trends in technology transfers, Figure 1 displays 
pre- and post reform averages of the ratio of aggregate royalties to aggregate sales in each 
                                                 
25  By prior agreement, our interviewees must remain anonymous.  
26  An additional complication is that some countries undertook a series of patent reforms in different years.  
Our current analysis focuses on the particular change to the patent system judged most likely to impact 
technology licensing by foreign firms.    16
country and year.  Each of the unshaded bars illustrates the average pre-reform ratios, and 
the shaded bars illustrate similar averages for the post reform period.  These are simple 
unconditional averages, but they are suggestive of an increase in the value of royalty 
payments relative to sales increases around the time of IPR reform.  Furthermore, it is 
clear that affiliates in the high patent sample make more extensive use of intangibles 
provided by the parent and that the ratio of royalty payments to sales increases by the 
largest amount for this sub-sample when reforms occur.
27 
  Of course, it is necessary to move beyond this figure to estimation of regressions 
that control for other factors influencing technology transfer and affiliate performance.  
Results of regression analysis of royalty payments made by affiliates located in the 
reforming countries to their parents based on specification (1) are reported in Table III.
28  
Columns (1)-(3) report the impact of IPR reform on log of the value of recorded licensing 
payments to the parent firm.
29  The specification in the first column is run on the full 
sample of affiliates, and the positive and statistically significant coefficient on the post 
reform dummy indicates that intrafirm royalty payments increase at the time of reforms.  
As additional regressors, all specifications in the table include the difference between the 
corporate income tax in the host country and the U.S., the host country withholding tax 
                                                 
27 Recall that the high patent sample includes affiliates of parents that, over the four years prior to a 
particular reform, average at least as many U.S. patent applications as the parent of the median affiliate in 
the reforming country over the same period. 
28   The sample used in generating Table III uses data on affiliates of U.S. firms in the reforming countries 
listed in Table II as well as data on their parent firms.  That is, data are drawn from countries that undergo 
IPR reform at some point over the 1982-1999 period.  An expansion of the sample to include affiliates 
based in all countries yielded results very similar to those shown in Table III.  These results and others 
referred to in the text but not shown in the tables are available from the authors upon request.    
29   A large number of affiliates, particularly those in low-tech industries, report zero values for technology 
transfer in most years.  We thus added 1 to all observations and took the log of the resulting values.  This 
transformation is standard in the older R&D and productivity literature.  Robustness checks described in 
the text remove affiliates that do not make royalty payments from the sample.    17
rate, an indicator of host country FDI restrictions, measures of host country openness to 
trade, and the log of host country GDP per capita.
30 
  The specifications in columns (2) and (3) examine how the effects of IPR reform 
differ for affiliates of parents that do and do not make extensive use of patents in the U.S.  
Since these specifications require information on the patent activity of parents, only 
affiliates of firms that can be linked to firms in the NBER patent database are included in 
the sample.  The high patent use dummy is equal to one for affiliates of parents that, over 
the four years prior to a particular reform, average at least as many U.S. patent 
applications as the parent of the median affiliate in the reforming country over the same 
period.  The coefficient on the post reform dummy in column (2) is positive but small and 
insignificant, while the coefficient on the post reform dummy interacted with the high 
patent use dummy is positive, large, and significant.  These results imply that the 
increases in technology transfer as measured by royalty payments that occur around the 
time of IPR reform are concentrated among affiliates of parents that use patents 
extensively.  These affiliates experience an increase in royalty payments of about 29%.  
This is an annual increase in technology flows from parent to affiliate.  Cumulated over 
several years, it implies a substantial increase in the technology intensity of the affiliates 
of patent-intensive parents. 
  Similar results are obtained from the specification presented in column (3) that 
also includes the log of affiliate sales, the log of parent R&D expenditures, and the log of 
parent system sales.  The first of these is meant to control for the expanding demand for 
technology of an affiliate as it grows, while the latter variables control for the expanding 
                                                 
30  Including measures of U.S. dollar real exchange rates vis-à-vis the host country currency did not 
qualitatively effect the results reported here.    18
potential supply of technology of a parent as it invests in R&D and grows in size.
31  The 
interaction term of the reform dummy with the high patent use dummy remains positive 
and significant here. 
  The specifications presented in columns (4)-(6) of Table III control for the scale 
of affiliate activity more directly by scaling royalty payments by sales.  The results of 
these specifications reveal whether affiliates use technology provided by the parent more 
intensively after reforms occur.  The positive and significant coefficient on the post 
reform dummy in column (4) indicates that this is the case.  The samples used in the last 
two specifications again include only affiliates of firms that can be linked to the NBER 
patent database.  The coefficients on the post reform dummy interacted with the high 
patent use dummy are positive and significant in these specifications, indicating larger 
increases in the value of parent provided intangibles, relative to sales, for affiliates that 
have parents that make extensive use of the U.S. patent system. 
  To allow for a more direct comparison with the effects reported in columns (1)-
(3), it is helpful to calculate the elasticity of the royalty to sales ratio with respect to 
reform.  To calculate this elasticity, we differentiate log(1 + royalties/sales) with respect 
































                                                 
31   As already noted, we recognize the potential endogeneity of these variables in this context.  However, 
the purpose here is not to derive structural estimates of, for instance, affiliate size on technology transfers.  
Rather, we only include these variables to control for parent-firm specific changes in technology supply 
and affiliate-specific changes in technology demand.      19
Where εratio is the elasticity of the royalty to sales ratio with respect to reform.  From 
Equation (1), we observe that εratio*ratio is given by the coefficient on our post-reform 
dummy, β4, which takes on a value of 0.008.  Since the mean value of ratio is 0.077, this 
implies that εratio is approximately ten percent.  For the high patent subsample, the 
implied effect of reform, based on the last two specifications, is 0.017, which implies an 
elasticity of 22 percent.  These values are roughly comparable to those generated by the 
level regressions reported above. 
We subjected these results to a number of robustness checks.  We incorporated 
parent firm – year fixed effects into our regression.  We dropped all affiliates that report 
zero licensing payments.  We expanded the sample to incorporate affiliates in all 
countries – not just those that underwent reform during our sample period.  To address 
the concern that our results might be driven by pharmaceutical firms, we dropped all 
affiliates in that industry and re-ran the specifications above.  None of these alternative 
specifications qualitatively changed our results. 
We also used propensity score techniques to match affiliates in the high patent 
sample in a country undergoing reform with another affiliate of the same patent-intensive 
parent firm located in a country that was not undergoing reform at that time.  This 
allowed us to compute “difference-in-difference” estimates of the impact of IPR reform 
on licensing, akin to those that have become common in the labor literature.  The results 
of this exercise also indicate an increase in licensing for this sub-sample that is similar to 
that shown in Table III. 
Our estimation strategy treats the timing of IPR reform in a given country as 
exogenous, at least with respect to the activities of U.S.-based multinational firms and    20
their affiliates.  Several different hypotheses can motivate concern over the potential 
endogeneity of reforms.  The most plausible of these hypotheses relates the development 
of a nation’s IPR system to its overall level of economic development and technological 
maturity.  According to this argument, at an early stage of development a strong patent 
system is neither essential nor necessary.  In fact, to the extent that it slows the diffusion 
of technology through imitation, it may even be counterproductive.  Once a nation 
reaches a certain threshold level of development, however, internal and external pressure 
builds for a stronger patent system.  This raises concerns that the nations in our sample 
were all reaching this threshold at about the time their regimes changed.  However, a 
casual look at the basic economic attributes of the IPR reforming countries in our sample 
drives home the point that they were at very different levels of economic development, 
and therefore could not have possibly been reaching a common development threshold at 
the time of their IPR reform.
32  
Another potential source of endogeneity is that reforms could have been driven by 
the desire of U.S. multinationals to obtain advantages in reforming markets.  This 
argument is premised on the assumption that these firms developed a list of lucrative 
potential markets, and pushed the U.S. government to apply diplomatic pressure on 
selected countries, at precisely the time that they wished to increase technology transfers.  
A first response to this concern is to observe that the relative value of stronger IPR in 
these countries is almost certainly correlated with levels of economic development, but 
reforms occur in countries with heterogeneous wealth levels.  In addition, it is useful to 
                                                 
32 IPR reform took place in Japan when per capita GDP was at a level of nearly $30,000 per year.  In Korea 
and Taiwan, reform took place when per capital GDP was about $10,000 per year. In Mexico and Thailand, 
reforms occurred when per capita GDP was about $5,000 per year, and in China – at least on paper – a 
reform took place when per capita GDP was well below $1,000 per year.    21
review the well documented diplomatic history of many of the regime changes.  Ryan 
(1996), Uphoff (1990), and our interviews with multinational managers and resident legal 
experts indicate that US pressure interacted in complicated ways with domestic counter 
pressure, and this interaction introduced an element of randomness into the timing of 
reforms that is exogenous to the wishes of U.S. multinationals.
33   
Despite these arguments, it is important to acknowledge that IPR reform is not a 
randomly assigned treatment.  It is not possible to know what would have happened in 
the counterfactual world in which IPR reforms did not occur, and this is an important 
caveat in using our results to predict the impact of IPR reforms in countries outside the of 
sample.
34   
 
4.2 Affiliate R&D Spending 
The pattern of increased royalty payments after reform is consistent with parents 
supplying more technology to their affiliates after reform, but this pattern could also be 
consistent with parents charging higher prices for the same level of technology provision.  
As discussed in Section 2, affiliate R&D is often focused on modification of the parent 
firm’s technology to meet local market conditions.  Therefore, affiliate R&D is a 
complement to technology imports from the parent.  If IPR reform stimulates an increase 
                                                 
33 Further evidence of this lack of diplomatic omnipotence is provided by the timing of other reforms that 
MNCs would obviously have an interest in promoting – such as a lifting of FDI restrictions and an 
expansion of openness to trade.  These controls have little impact on the results of this paper because they 
were not coincident with IPR reform.  For example, South Korea reformed its patent system in the late 
1980s, but U.S. multinational’s ability to profit from this was limited by the fact that South Korea 
maintained limits on FDI until the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98.  On the other hand, US MNCs had a 
substantial FDI presence in countries like the Philippines and Brazil, but these countries could not be 
induced to change their IPR regimes until 1997 – and these changes were mostly in response to the 
requirements of TRIPs rather than a response to diplomatic pressure from the U.S. 
34 This problem is common to much of the recent work on such topics as the impact of customs unions on 
trade flows, the impact of common currencies on investment flows, and the impact of bilateral tax treaties 
on FDI.    22
in the volume of technology deployed, then it should also stimulate an increase in 
affiliate R&D spending.   
To test if changes in R&D activity indicate any increase in the volume of 
technology transferred, the analysis in Table IV examines the impact of IPR reform on 
affiliate R&D activity.  The specifications presented parallel those presented in Table III, 
with the only difference being that the log of affiliate R&D expenditures and the log of 
affiliate R&D expenditures scaled by sales are used as dependent variables.
35  The results 
presented in column (1) imply positive, marginally significant effect of IPR reform on the 
R&D spending of the average affiliate in the full sample.   
The specifications in column (2) and (3) include the post reform dummy 
interacted with the high patent use dummy to test if the effects of IPR reform are 
particularly concentrated among firms that make the most extensive use of patents in the 
U.S.  The large positive and significant coefficients on the interaction terms illustrate that 
this is the case.  The results in column (3), for instance, imply that IPR reform leads to a 
27% increase in R&D spending by the affiliates of patent-intensive parents.  Because 
R&D represents a cost born by the parent system, the coincidence of the measured 
increase in R&D spending with the measured increase in licensing payments suggests 
that at least some component of the latter represents a real increase in the deployment of 
technology to affiliates.   
Columns (4)-(6) of Table IV provide the results of specifications in which R&D 
expenditure is scaled by affiliate sales.  Although the results in column (1) indicates that 
                                                 
35 A large number of affiliates, particularly those in low-tech industries, report zero values for R&D 
expenditures in most years.  We thus add 1 to all observations and took the log of the resulting values.  This 
transformation is standard in the older R&D and productivity literature.   Robustness checks described in 
the text remove affiliates that do not conduct R&D from the sample.    23
there is a small, marginally significant decline in R&D intensiveness among the full 
sample of affiliates at the time of reforms, the specifications in column (5) and (6) reveal 
a distinct effect for the high patent sub-sample.  Affiliates of parents that make extensive 
use of patents in the U.S. increase their R&D intensiveness by more than other affiliates 
when IPR reforms occur. 
The robustness of our results on affiliate R&D spending was tested in a number of 
alternative specifications.  We incorporated parent firm – year fixed effects into our 
specification.  We dropped observations for affiliates that report zero R&D spending.  
We expanded the sample to include all available countries, not just those undergoing IPR 
reform over our sample period.  As with our results on royalty payments, we also used 
propensity score techniques to match affiliates in the high patent sample in countries 
undergoing IPR reform to an affiliate of the same patent-intensive parent located in a 
country that was not undergoing IPR reform at that time.  The resulting “difference-in-
differences” estimate of the increase in annual R&D spending was qualitatively similar to 
that reported in Table IV. 
 
4.3 Arm’s length licensing 
  U.S. firms not only receive royalty payments for the sale or use of intangibles 
from their affiliates but also from unaffiliated foreigners.  Table V displays results of 
tests of how these royalty payments respond to changes in IPR regimes.  The first two 
columns examine flows to firms that do and do not have affiliates in the country from 
which payments are made.  The coefficient on the post reform dummy is positive and 
marginally significant in column (1).  The next column considers flows from unaffiliated    24
parties in a particular country to parent firms that have an affiliate in that country.  There 
is no evidence that IPR reform affects these flows.
36  The final column presents a 
specification that analyzes flows from countries to firms that do not have affiliates in 
those countries.  The results in column (3) indicate that IPR reforms have a measurable 
impact for firms that do not have affiliates in reforming countries prior to reforms. 
  These findings are consistent with the predictions of the model laid out in 
Appendix B, provided it is less expensive to transfer technology within firms rather than 
across firm boundaries.  To the extent to that indigenous enterprises lack either the 
technical skill or access to the capital necessary to fully exploit U.S. multinational parent 
firm technology, it may be optimal to deploy technology through foreign affiliates.
37  The 
inability of foreign legal regimes to perfectly enforce complicated contracts may 
influence the shape of the expropriation function in a way that favors deployment within 
affiliates.  Finally, it has been well documented in other recent research that U.S. 
multinationals have been increasingly outsourcing non-strategic activities, but 
increasingly “in-sourcing” strategically sensitive activity in recent years.
38  This is 
consistent with the general pattern of the reported results. 
 
4.4 Resident versus Non-Resident Patenting 
  Figure 2 presents a first look at how patent filings by foreigners and domestic 
residents change after IPR reform.  This figure presents ratios of patent filings in the 
                                                 
36   The evident preference for U.S. multinationals to transfer new technology to wholly owned subsidiaries 
is documented elsewhere.  See, for instance, Lee and Mansfield (1996). 
37   Considerable support for this view is provided by Lee and Mansfield (1996).  These authors take a 
cross-sectional approach, but they also find that activity within wholly owned subsidiaries is more 
responsive to changes in IPR regimes than activity within entities over which the multinational parents 
have less control. 
38   See, for instance, the work of Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004).    25
years around the time of reform to the level recorded in the year immediately preceding 
patent reform.  This figure suggests that, relative to the pre-reform period, patenting 
grows for nonresidents after reform.  However, patenting by domestic residents is flat.  
This pattern is broadly consistent with the findings of Lerner (2001, 2002).  It also 
suggests that at least one component of the observed increase in licensing payments is 
connected to an increase in the volume of technology transferred.   
To study patterns in patent data more carefully, the analysis presented in Table VI 
measures the impact of IPR reform on patent filings by both domestic and foreign 
innovators.  The log of the counts of patent filings is regressed on the post reform 
dummy, an interaction term between the post reform dummy and an overall time trend, 
country and year fixed effects, country specific time trends, and some additional controls.  
Columns (1)-(4) present specifications where the dependent variable is the log of resident 
patent filings.  In column (1), the coefficient on the post reform dummy is 
indistinguishable from zero, indicating that resident patent filings do not increase after 
reforms occur.  Column (2) includes two additional controls: the log of host country GDP 
per capita and the log of host country net inward FDI.  The post reform dummy remains 
insignificant.  As the results in the next two columns show, the post reform dummy 
interacted with a time trend is also insignificant, indicating that the growth rate of 
resident patent filings does not increase after reforms.  These findings are consistent with 
Lerner (2002). 
  Columns (5)-(8) present similar specifications for non-resident patent filings.  
There is robust evidence that these filings experience large increases and that these filings 
grow at an increased rate after reforms.  The coefficient on the post reform dummy in    26
columns (5) and (6) imply increases in non-resident filings that exceed 35%.  The 
positive and statistically significant coefficients on the post reform dummy interacted 
with the time trend in columns (7) and (8) imply faster growth over time in the number of 
non-resident filings after reforms.  These findings provide additional evidence that MNEs 
increase the quantity of technology transferred after IPR reform.   
   
5. Conclusion 
  Understanding the effects of intellectual property rights on various types of 
international activity is an important agenda in economic research.  This paper 
empirically tests the hypothesis that IPR reforms increase technology transfers between 
countries by analyzing how measures of U.S. affiliate activity and levels of foreign 
patenting change in a set of 12 countries that undergo reforms.   
There are some significant advantages associated with this approach.  By 
examining discrete reforms of IPR, the analysis includes country or affiliate fixed effects 
and therefore controls for time-invariant country and firm characteristics that are often 
correlated with factors that influence the decision to transfer technology.  The firm-level 
data used in this paper cover affiliates of U.S. MNEs that report information in a 
consistent way across countries.  The use of these firm-level data also permit tests that 
reveal whether IPR reforms have the largest consequences for firms that would be 
expected to value such reforms the most. 
The results provide strong evidence that U.S. multinationals respond to changes in 
IPR regimes abroad by increasing technology transfers to reforming countries.  In the 
wake of legal reforms that strengthen patent rights, intrafirm royalty payments made by    27
affiliates to parents increase, and these increases are concentrated among affiliates of 
parents that intensively patent innovations in the U.S. prior to reforms.  Analyzing 
patterns in affiliate R&D spending, which is a complement to the transfer of technology, 
indicates that at least some component of increased royalty payments reflects increases in 
the volume of technology transferred and not merely increases in the price of technology 
transferred.  Affiliates increase their R&D expenditures at the time of reforms.  These 
increases are also concentrated among affiliates of parents that use U.S. patents 
intensively, and they are of a similar magnitude to the changes in royalty payments.  
Additional evidence that the volume of technology transferred increases comes from 
patent data drawn from countries that undergo reforms.  While the level of domestic 
patent applications is unaffected by reforms, foreign patent applications increase, in terms 
of both levels and growth rates.   
These results are not, of course, sufficient to demonstrate that IPR reform is 
welfare enhancing for the reforming countries.  The analysis does not consider the impact 
of reforms on locally owned firms that may be displaced after reforms nor does it 
examine the effects of the reforms on the pace of innovation in non-reforming countries.  
However, given the lack of evidence that IPR reform spurs domestic innovation, 
increases in technology transfer are likely to be a necessary condition for IPR reform to 
increase welfare in reforming countries.  Our results suggest that this condition is met. 
The findings in this paper could be extended in several ways.  One promising 
direction would be to use patent data broken down by narrowly defined technology class 
and the nationality of the inventor.  In the absence of strong IPR protection, 
multinationals may limit the deployment of certain critical technologies – typically, more    28
advanced technologies -- for fear that they will be imitated by local rivals.  The existence 
of stronger IPR could induce multinationals to deploy these technologies because they 
now have a legal remedy against imitation.  Using highly disaggregated data on 
international patenting available from the European Patent Office, we can actually track 
the filing of patent applications in sensitive, highly advanced technological areas.   While 
data on royalty payments provide us, at least in principle, with measures of the economic 
value of technology deployed by affiliates, highly disaggregated patent data allow us, in 
principle, to track the technological content of the underlying technology flows. 
The international economics literature has established that changes in the IPR 
environment will affect the trade-off between licensing, local production, and exports.  It 
is possible to embed IPR regime changes within a larger model in which the level of 
investment in a country and exports from production facilities located outside the country 
are also endogenously determined.  The imposition of more structure holds the promise 
of providing further insight on the global welfare impact of recent changes in IPR 
systems.  Recent contributions to the theory of the multinational firm provide us with a 
useful foundation on which to build.
39   
                                                 
39  See Markusen (2000) and, for a treatment that combines empirics and theory, Carr, Markusen, and 
Maskus (2001).    29
 
  Appendix A: Details of Reforms 
Since the intent of this paper is to draw general lessons from the last twenty years 
of IPR reform, we do not analyze particular aspects of individual IPR reforms in detail.  
However, this appendix provides a brief description of the various IPR reforms studied in 
this paper.  More details are available from the authors upon request.   
As a prelude to this description, it is important to emphasize two points.  First, in 
most countries, reform of the IPR system is an ongoing process.  The dates assigned to 
each country mark a particularly significant stage in this process – a widely recognized 
turning point in the evolution of the system.  Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that 
this date marks the onset of a process rather then the establishment of a henceforth 
unchanging IPR regime.  Since identification in the empirical analysis comes from 
differences in the timing of reforms, the analysis is testing if multinational technology 
transfer changes when these turning points occur.   
Second, we consulted wide range of sources concerning the reform process in the 
sample countries.  While our starting point was the general description of international 
IPR reforms found in Maskus (2000), that information has been heavily supplemented by 
a close reading of other secondary sources, extensive interviews with patent lawyers 
based in the reforming countries, multinational managers with extensive experience in 
IPR-intensive industries in the reforming countries, and consultants specializing in 
international IPR issues.  There is generally a broad consensus concerning the date of the 
significant turning point in IPR reform in each country.    30
The IPR reforms in the sample can be grouped into four overlapping categories:  
reforms that changed the administration of the patent law and related statutes, reforms 
that changed both the law itself and the administration of the law, reforms that included 
the expansion of patentable subject matter, and reforms that involved the promulgation of 
a new law, but little in the way of de facto administrative change.      
  An example of a reform that might be primarily classified in the first category is 
the Japanese patent reform of 1995.  This reform followed changes to Japan’s patent law 
in the late 1980s, ratification of the TRIPs agreement, and the successful conclusion of 
negotiations with the United States to harmonize the two countries’ patent systems.
40  A 
key feature of this reform package was the replacement of Japan’s pre-grant opposition 
system with a post-grant opposition system.  Under the prior regime in Japan, patent 
applications were laid open to public inspection prior to the grant.  Interested parties 
could then contest the patent grant through a quasi-judicial procedure administered by the 
Japanese patent office.  This pre-grant opposition system led to long, unpredictable 
delays in the granting process and considerable ex ante uncertainty concerning the degree 
to which the patent office would uphold the claims in a patent application.  The post-
grant opposition system allowed for more or less automatic granting of a patent once 
patent examiners had studied the patent application’s claims and certified their validity.  
This administrative reform also coincided with a substantial increase in the number of 
patent examiners and a further computerization of the Japanese patent office (JPO), both 
                                                 
40   Ratification of the TRIPs agreement necessitated an extension of patent length in Japan (from fifteen to 
twenty years) and other, mostly technical changes in the patent statute.  The 1995 reforms helped cement a 
process of strengthening of the Japanese patent system that began in the late 1980s (Sakakibara and 
Branstetter, 2001).  For a careful historical perspective on Japanese patent reform that brings one up to the 
developments of the late 1990s, see Goto (2003).    31
of which strengthened the administrative capacity of the JPO and reduced delays in 
examination and the granting of patents.   
  Perhaps the best example of a reform that changed both the substance of the law 
and its administration is the reform that took place in Mexico in 1991.
41  The preceding 
IPR legal regime was effectively abolished and a completely new legal system with a 
new administering institution was established.  Whereas the implicit goal of the previous 
IPR regime had been to limit the ability of patent holders to control access to their 
patented technology, the goal of the new regime was explicitly to ensure adequate 
protection to incumbent patent holders.  Patent protection was expanded to incorporate 
pharmaceutical and chemical products.  Previous restrictions on terms of licensing 
technology were abolished, allowing these terms to be determined at the discretion of the 
contracting parties.  Legal tools were introduced to aid in the prosecution of patent 
infringement, including inspections of the facilities of potential infringers, the seizure of 
goods and closure of facilities involved in infringement, and the effective prohibition of 
parallel imports.     
The Brazilian patent reform of 1997 was of a similar nature.  In addition to 
significant legal changes, the reform also introduced guidelines for judges to use in the 
determination of damages as a result of infringement.  Judges were also provided with 
additional means to stop illicit activities including powers to grant preliminary 
injunctions to seize infringing products and close down infringing production.
42   Spain’s 
                                                 
41   While such surveys also have their problems, it is worth pointing out that surveys of multinational 
managers (such as the World Competitiveness Report, issued by the World Economic Forum) tend to give 
high marks to the effective enforcement of the new IPR regime in Mexico. 
42   From the perspective of multinational pharmaceutical companies, the Brazilian reform process took a 
step backward in 2000, when the Health Ministry took steps to block the granting of new pharmaceutical 
products.  According to our sources, these difficulties persist to the present.    32
integration with the EU also required fundamental changes in both Spanish patent law 
and practice in 1986, although the implementation of key changes in Spanish law were 
delayed until 1992.  At least on paper, reforms in Turkey and in the Philippines also had 
some of these characteristics in that the institutions administering the patent system were 
changed at the same time as the law itself.  While perceptions differ among multinational 
managers, our interviews conveyed the impression that enforcement has been more 
problematic in these contexts than in Mexico or Spain.  Turkish patent law was changed 
in the mid-1990s, but implementation of key features of the law was explicitly delayed 
until 2005.  Implementation was later moved up to 1999, but this feature clearly muted 
the initial reaction of multinational firms.   
  A number of patent reforms in our sample broadened the definition of patentable 
subject matter to include pharmaceutical, food, and agro-chemical products.  Reforms 
with this feature included those of Spain (1986), South Korea (1987), Mexico (1991), 
Brazil (1997), and Turkey (1995).  Prior to this expansion, foreign and domestic 
inventors could generally patent the process by which a chemical or pharmaceutical 
compound was produced, but not the compound itself.  Because of the ease with which 
many such products could be produced through alternate means, the restriction to process 
patents drastically limited the degree of IPR protection in these fields.  The extension of 
patents to these areas was quite a significant change, and one would expect the growth of 
foreign patenting after reform to be disproportionately concentrated in these fields.  In 
fact, some countries, including Mexico and Brazil, actually introduced a provision 
whereby patents for which the international 12 month “grace period” had already expired    33
could be granted in these formerly restricted areas.
43  The effectiveness with which these 
provisions have been enforced can sometimes be inferred from local financial markets.  
For instance, an event study of stock prices of South Korean pharmaceutical firms (most 
of which focused on copycat production of drugs for which patents were not allowed in 
Korea) shows that these prices plummeted with the implementation of the 1987 
reforms.
44 
  Finally, there are reforms for which effective implementation has been almost 
completely absent.  In 1993, after extensive negotiations with the United States, China 
introduced a patent statute which seemed to offer substantial protection for patent 
holders.  However, this law has not been effectively enforced.
45  Interestingly, our 
regression results tend to confirm the conventional wisdom regarding the IPR 
environment in China.  When versions of equation (1) are estimated using only Chinese 
data, there is no measurable response whatsoever to the enactment of Chinese patent 
reform – precisely the result one would expect if effective enforcement were absent and 
widely recognized as such.  On the other hand, estimates of equation (1) on data for 
countries such as Mexico, where the reforms are widely considered to have been both 
substantial and effectively enforced, tend to give large and statistically significant results.  
                                                 
43   International patent conventions prior to the TRIPs Agreement allowed an inventor up to 12 months to 
choose the countries in which she would seek patent protection and initiate the patent application process.  
This period typically dated from the application for patent protection in the first country chosen by the 
inventor.  After this 12 month period expired, the invention would be effectively regarded as part of the 
“public domain” in all countries in which the inventor had not explicitly sought protection. Recall that there 
is no global patent system.  Patent protection must be sought in each country. 
44   See La Croix and Kawaura (1996). 
45   Argentina’s 1996 pledge to strengthen the IPR environment, particularly for pharmaceutical products, 
has also been heavily criticized due to weak enforcement.    34
 
Appendix B  A Simple Model of IPR and Firm-Level Technology Transfers 
We provide here a simple firm-level model of responses to IPR regime changes. 
Since we are generally considering reactions to discrete IPR regime shifts in individual 
markets that may not loom large in a firm’s overall level of sales, we may safely take the 
firm’s stock of innovations as being held constant, and may therefore ignore (at least for 
now) the induced effect of IPR reform on future innovation. 
Our model is similar to that of Green and Scotchmer (1995), in that we consider 
the sequential choice of introduction of technology to a new market followed by a 
decision of whether to license to other producers.  However, in transforming their model 
to the context of technology transfers, we make a number of changes, including the 
incorporation of a second-stage model of spatial competition.   
We model a multinational firm that is considering a transfer of technology that 
will generate additional profits.  The cost of transferring this technology is given by t.  
We may think of this as an innovation that improves an existing good, or an entirely new 
product, and normalize the ‘no transfer’ case to yielding a zero payoff for the 
multinational.  Below, we will allow this transfer cost to depend on whether the 
technology is being licensed (tl) or used by a multinational affiliate (ta).  This differential 
may arise, for example, because of the greater difficulties in transacting across firm 
boundaries. 
  Conditional on deciding to enter the market, the firm must decide whether to 
transfer the technology through a local affiliate or by licensing the technology to an 
unrelated party.  If the technology is licensed to an outside party, a licensing fee, L, is    35
paid by the licensee.
46  If the firm chooses to produce through a local affiliate, then it 
competes directly in the market.
47  If entry occurs through licensing, there is some 
probability that the licensee fails to pay the licensing fee (q), and this depends on the 
extent of IPR enforcement, s, so that q=q(s).  
  The structure of competition, conditional on entry, also depends on the extent of 
IPR protection.  We model this as a simple “linear city” model of product differentiation 
on the interval [0,1], with a uniform distribution of customers who face transport costs 
mx, where x is the “distance” from the firm that makes the sale (see, for example, Tirole, 
1993, for details).
48  The multinational occupies the point at zero, and we assume that the 
closest competitor is given by s, so that improved IPR broadens the firm’s monopoly 
power.  On [s,1], we assume free entry, so that the price charged by this ‘fringe’ group 
will be unaffected by s (let this price be  po) .  For the multinational affiliate, the marginal 
cost of production is ca, a constant.  If entry takes place through exclusive arm’s-length 
licensing, we assume that the licensee faces an exactly parallel set of circumstances, 
except possibly with a different marginal cost of production (cl). 
  The timing of the game is therefore as follows: 
1.  Decide whether to provide the technology to the market. 
2.  Choose mode of transfer (arm’s-length licensing versus affiliate). 
3.  If entry through arm’s-length licensing, technology is stolen with probability q(s) 
4.  Licensee/Affiliate competes in spatial differentiation game. 
                                                 
46 We assume a lump sum licensing fee (independent of sales).  This is optimal in the context of the simple 
model described here, since it avoids problems of double marginalization.  
47 For simplicity, we do not consider the case where profit may be maximized by entering through an 
affiliate and licensing.  For this to make sense, it would have to be necessary for the multinational to either 
control downstream prices, or for a duopoly to generate greater profits that a monopoly.  Furthermore, 
empirically, we largely see firms either licensing or transferring technology to affiliates, but not both. 
48 In this context, it is natural to think of distance as representing the gap between the characteristics of 
goods and the consumer’s desires rather than geographical distance.    36
To determine the equilibrium entry decisions of the multinationals, as a function of the 
model’s parameters, we work backwards.  In the final stage, the position of the marginal 
consumer, x, is determined by: 










It is then straightforward to calculate the profit maximizing levels of output, price, and 
profitability as a function of the model’s parameters, in particular, s.  Profits are given by: 








= π  
First order conditions therefore yield: 
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Under these conditions, it is straightforward that: 






dp a a π
  
The intuition is clear: greater IPR expands the product space over which the firm enjoys 
monopoly power.  As a result, profits and price increase.  While the firm’s sales also 
increase, aggregate sales remain unchanged, by construction. 
Note that the above description assumes that the multinational’s monopoly price 
is low enough such that all customers are served.  However, if we consider the possibility 
that consumers have a reservation utility, u*, then a purchase will only be made if u*>pa 
+ mx.  If price were already high enough that some customers were not served by any    37
firm, then the extent of IPR would be irrelevant for the firm’s pricing decisions, as it 
would already effectively have an effective monopoly over the relevant range.  In this 
case, increasing IPR does not affect the multinational, but decreases the overall level of 
output, due to the further crowding out of the competitive fringe. 
 
Entry through arm’s-length licensing versus affiliate 
We model the licensing to an unrelated party transaction as essentially the sale of the 
right to the product space, [0,s], that the multinational enjoys in the previously described 
model of spatial competition.  If this is the case, then the profit earned by the licensee 
may be calculated in exactly the same manner as above, with the total level of profits 
dependent upon s, as well as the firm’s marginal cost of production.  Once we add in the 
cost of transferring technology, which we expect to differ between arm’s length and 
internal transfers, and the probability of no-license payment, we generate two obvious 
conditions on the subsidiary versus licensing choice: 
(6)     a a l t c s t L s q − > − − ) , ( )) ( 1 ( π  
( 7)       0 ) ( ) , ( > − L s q c s l π  
Equation (7) reflects the domestic firm’s participation constraint, while (6) represents the 
multinational’s trade-off between licensing and direct investment.  Once again, it is 
straightforward that the choice is dependent on the level of s, and in particular, how this 
affects the probability of expropriation, q(s), as s increases.  Furthermore, to the extent 
that domestic or foreign firms are more effective in serving a particular market, this will 
manifest itself in the form of differential values of cL versus cf.  Overall, it will not be    38
possible to sign the licensing-affiliate choice as a function of s, as this will depend on 
transfer and production costs, as well as the shape of q(s). 
  Working back to the final stage, it is again straightforward that, since both πl and 
πa will increase with s, technology transfers will increase with stronger property rights 
enforcement; as a result, profits are pushed toward the threshold at which they offset 
transfer costs. 
We may now summarize the characteristics of our model that will be relevant for the 
empirical estimation: 
1.  An increase in IPR leads to an increase in technology transfers by multinationals  
2.  The extent to which these transfers take place through licensing to third parties 
relative to affiliates will depend on the relative expertise of the multinational 
relative to domestic producers (ca versus cl), the relative costs of transferring 
technology (ta versus tl), and the shape of the ‘expropriation function’, q(s). 
3.  IPR improvements will increase firm profitability, output, and price. 
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-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Year Relative to Reform
Non-Resident Patent Filings
Resident Patent Filings1982 1989 1994 1999
Number of Affiliates 3,275               3,524               4,235               5,026              
Number of Parents 803                  875                  1,069               1,090              
Intrafirm Royalty Payments
    Mean 182                  631                  1,036               1,087              
    Standard Deviation 2,567               14,986             16,092             15,938            
R&D Expenditures
    Mean 136                  478                  555                  644                 
    Standard Deviation 1,001               10,320             4,753               7,070              
Sales
    Mean 63,383             87,034             98,460             114,191          
    Standard Deviation 328,242           497,225           555,079           493,295          
Parent R&D Expenditures
    Mean 82,933             84,282             75,505             97,435            
    Standard Deviation 285,963           364,134           345,105           399,608          
Parent System Sales
    Mean 3,349,773        4,013,461        4,293,810        6,146,036       
    Standard Deviation 9,728,727        11,648,800      13,307,540      17,628,410     
Arms Length Royalty Payments
    Mean na 48                    75                    122                 
    Standard Deviation na 1,562               2,503               4,719              
Number of Non-Resident Patent Filings
    Mean 5,992               11,022             20,606             58,572            
    Standard Deviation 7,955               13,722             21,597             44,470            
Number of Resident Patent Filings
    Mean 27,183             33,511             36,673             44,024            
    Standard Deviation 74,236             99,849             100,010           112,760          
Descriptive Statistics for all Affiliate Years Mean St. Dev
Difference of Host Country Tax Rate and US Tax Rate -0.0268 0.1328
Host Country Withholding Tax Rate 0.0670 0.0823
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions 0.0778 0.2678
Host Country Trade Openness 35.1122 23.5311
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita 9.0308 0.6962
Log of Host Country FDI 21.1733 1.6761
Benchmark Years
Table I
Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Multinational Activity in Reforming Countries
The top panel provides descriptive statistics for the data obtained from BEA surveys and from WIPO.  Intrafirm royalty payments are royalty payments made by
affiliates to their parents for the sale or use of intangible assets and like the other financial data are measured in thousands of dollars.  Parent R&D Expenditures
are the R&D expenditures of the domestic operations of the parent.  In years for which these data are unavailable, R&D expenditures for consolidated parent 
companies from COMPUSTAT are used.  Parent System Sales are the total sales of the parent and its affiliates.  Arms Length Royalty Payments are royalty 
payments made by unaffiliated foreign persons to U.S. persons that may or may not be parents of multinationals.  The Number of Non-Resident Patent Filings 
and the Number of Resident Patent Filings are counts of patent applications by non-residents and residents in a particular country and year.  The bottom
panel provides descriptive statistics for the country level control variables that are used in the analysis.  The Difference of Host Country Tax Rate and US Tax 
Rate is the difference between the corporate income tax rate in the host country and the US corporate income tax rate.  The Host Country Tax Rate and the Host
Country Withholding Tax Rate are annual median tax rates paid by affiliates in a host country.  Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions is a dummy equal to one 
when inward FDI restrictions exist, and it is drawn from Brune (2001).  Host Country Trade Openness is the index of constant price openness taken from 
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  The Log of Host Country GDP per capita and the Log of Host Country FDI are derived from data provided in the World 
Bank World Development Indicators (2003).Country Year of 
Reform
1982 1999
Argentina 1996 206 388
Brazil 1997 601 596
China 1993 11 522
Indonesia 1991 143 169
Japan 1995 704 928
South Korea 1987 93 241
Mexico 1991 702 927
The Philippines 1997 186 163
Spain 1986 362 569
Taiwan 1993 118 235
Thailand 1992 87 225
Turkey 1995 27 116
Number of Affiliates in 
BEA database
Table II
Timing of Major Patent Reforms
This table provides information about the timing of reforms in the countries 
that strengthen their intellectual property rights and the number of reporting 
affiliates present in these countries at the beginning and end of the sample 
period.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 22.5149 22.1481 62.5752 0.1086 0.1072 0.1660
(21.2651) (30.2057) (31.7866) (0.1140) (0.1559) (0.1619)
Post Reform Dummy 0.0980 0.0199 0.0247 0.0008 0.0005 0.0006
(0.0412) (0.0647) (0.0664) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
0.2657 0.2130 0.0012 0.0011
(0.0715) (0.0732) (0.0004) (0.0004)
-0.0519 -0.2144 -0.2924 -0.0005 -0.0035 -0.0038
(0.2458) (0.3675) (0.3782) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0019)
Host Country Withholding Tax Rate 0.2077 0.1078 0.0699 -0.0015 -0.0060 -0.0062
(0.3359) (0.4950) (0.5198) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0024)
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions -0.1427 -0.1108 -0.1038 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0672) (0.1103) (0.1103) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Host Country Trade Openness 0.0063 0.0050 0.0038 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita 1.1022 1.1045 1.0772 0.0028 0.0032 0.0035
(0.1919) (0.2758) (0.2854) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Log of Affiliate Sales 0.0993
(0.0130)
Log of Parent R&D Expenditures 0.0138 0.0001
(0.0103) (0.0000)
Log of Parent System Sales 0.3244 0.0000
(0.0678) (0.0003)
Affiliate and Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYY
Country Specific Time Trends? YYYYYY
No. of Obs. 44,375          16,998          16,418          42,387          16,553          16,038         
R-Squared 0.7468 0.7261 0.7289 0.6739 0.6735 0.6764
Intrafirm Royalty Payments and IPR Regime Changes
Table III
Log of Intrafirm Royalty Payments
Log of Intrafirm Royalty 
Payments/Affiliate Sales
Difference of Host Country Tax Rate and 
US Tax Rate
Post Reform Dummy * High Patent Use 
Dummy
The dependent variable in the first three columns is the log of one plus the value of royalty payments made by affiliates to their parents, and the 
dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the log of one plus the ratio of intrafirm royalty payments to affiliate sales.  The Post Reform Dummy is a dummy 
equal to one in the year of reform and in the years following the reforms identified in Table II.  The High Patent Use Dummy is a dummy that is equal to 
one for affiliates of parents that over the four years prior to a reform average at least as many patent applications as the parents of the median affiliate in 
the reforming country.  The Difference of Host Country Tax Rate and US Tax Rate is the difference between the corporate income tax rate in the host 
country and the US corporate income tax rate.  The Host Country Tax Rate and the Host Country Withholding Tax Rate are annual median tax rates paid 
by affiliates in a host country.  Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions is a dummy equal to one when inward FDI restrictions exist, and it is drawn from 
Brune (2001).  Host Country Trade Openness is the index of constant price openness taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).
The Log of Host Country GDP per capita is derived from data provided in the World Bank World Development Indicators (2003).  Log of Affiliate Sales 
is the log of the value of affiliate sales, and Log of Parent R&D Expenditures is the log of the affiliate's parent R&D expenditures.  The Log of Parent 
System Sales is the log of total sales of the parent and its affiliates.  All specifications include affiliate and year fixed effects as well as country specific 
time trends.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors appear in parentheses.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 14.1964 92.9742 104.2398 -0.0516 0.1424 0.0819
(35.8392) (51.6872) (52.9545) (0.1390) (0.1807) (0.1843)
Post Reform Dummy 0.1010 -0.0144 -0.0099 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0590) (0.0946) (0.0949) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004)
0.3353 0.2775 0.0009 0.0009
(0.1020) (0.1026) (0.0004) (0.0004)
0.5095 -0.1515 -0.2776 0.0039 0.0018 0.0017
(0.4135) (0.6082) (0.6097) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Host Country Withholding Tax Rate 1.1866 0.0313 -0.0101 0.0055 0.0025 0.0025
(0.5846) (0.8906) (0.9068) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions -0.1126 -0.1832 -0.1976 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0901) (0.1420) (0.1409) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Host Country Trade Openness 0.0049 0.0127 0.0138 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0049) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita 0.5103 0.7723 0.5534 0.0010 0.0011 0.0012
(0.3771) (0.5953) (0.6073) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Log of Affiliate Sales 0.1472
(0.0184)
Log of Parent R&D Expenditures 0.0285 0.0002
(0.0150) (0.0001)
Log of Parent System Sales 0.0779 -0.0007
(0.1061) (0.0004)
Affiliate and Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYY
Country Specific Time Trends? YYYYYY
No. of Obs. 26,654        9,688          9,623          25,343        9,369          9,346         
R-Squared 0.7370 0.6961 0.6983 0.6858 0.6749 0.6751
Difference of Host Country Tax Rate and 
US Tax Rate
Table IV
Affiliate R&D Expenses and IPR Regime Changes
Log of R&D Expenditures
Log of R&D Expenditures/Affiliate 
Sales
Post Reform Dummy * High Patent Use 
Dummy
The dependent variable in the first three columns is the log of one plus the value of affiliate R&D expenditures, and the dependent variable in columns 
4-6 is the log of one plus the ratio of affiliate R&D expenditures to affiliate sales.  The Post Reform Dummy is a dummy equal to one in the year of 
and the years following the reforms identified in Table II.  The High Patent Use Dummy is a dummy that is equal to one for affiliates of parents that 
over the fours years prior to a reform average at least as many patent applications as the median affiliate in the reforming country.  The Difference of 
Host Country Tax Rate and US Tax Rate is the difference between the corporate income tax rate in the host country and the US corporate income tax 
rate.  The Host Country Tax Rate and the Host Country Withholding Tax Rate are annual median tax rates paid by affiliates in a host country.  Host 
Country Inward FDI Restrictions is a dummy equal to one when inward FDI restrictions exist, and it is drawn from Brune (2001).  Host Country Trade 
Openness is the index of constant price openness taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  The Log of Host Country GDP per capita is derived f
is the log of the value of affiliate sales, and Log of Parent R&D Expenditures is the log of the affiliate's parent R&D expenditures.  The Log of Parent 
System Sales is the log of total sales of the parent and its affiliates.  All specifications include affiliate and year fixed effects as well as country 
specific time trends.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors appear in parentheses.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 13.7093 97.0149 11.8042
(25.7812) (99.3360) (31.4634)
Post Reform Dummy 0.0454 0.0904 0.0592
(0.0261) (0.1028) (0.0292)
Difference of Host Country Tax Rate and US Tax Rate -0.0389 -0.6281 0.1346
(0.1670) (0.6535) (0.1978)
Host Country Withholding Tax Rate -1.0048 -1.9413 -0.7489
(0.5452) (1.9997) (0.6592)
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions -0.1451 -0.1782 -0.1405
(0.0758) (0.2386) (0.0911)
Host Country Trade Openness -0.0004 0.0056 -0.0019
(0.0028) (0.0134) (0.0034)
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita 0.4540 0.5724 0.5373
(0.2009) (0.6856) (0.2385)
Parent/Country and Year Fixed Effects? YYY
Country Specific Time Trend? YYY
No. of Obs. 46,460             4,871               28,914            
R-Squared 0.7643 0.7642 0.7481
Table V
Arm's Length Royalty Payments and IPR Regime Changes
The dependent variable in each specification is the log of one plus the value of royalty payments made by unaffiliated foreign persons to 
US firms for the sale or use of intangible assets.  The Post Reform Dummy is a dummy equal to one in the year of and the years 
following the reforms identified in Table II.  The Difference of Host Country Tax Rate and US Tax Rate is the difference between the 
corporate income tax rate in the host country and the US corporate income tax rate.  The Host Country Tax Rate and the Host Country 
Withholding Tax Rate are annual median tax rates paid by affiliates in a host country.  Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions is a 
dummy equal to one when inward FDI restrictions exist, and it is drawn from Brune (2001).  Host Country Trade Openness is the index 
of constant price openness taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  The Log of Host Country GDP per capita is derived from 
data provided in the World Bank World Development Indicators (2003).  All specifications include firm/country fixed effects as well as 
country specific time trends.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors appear in parentheses.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 7.0197 20.7387 6.6135 19.7757 7.8368 -8.1660 6.8564 -4.1342
(0.6487) (10.2948) (0.7204) (9.7460) (0.4270) (6.8139) (0.5344) (6.4278)
Post Reform Dummy 0.0183 0.0800 0.0792 0.1605 0.3841 0.4257 0.5435 0.5881
(0.2114) (0.2203) (0.2063) (0.2163) (0.1352) (0.1329) (0.1295) (0.1255)
Post Reform Dummy * Time Trend 0.1065 0.1269 0.2706 0.2488
(0.0962) (0.1012) (0.0690) (0.0679)
Host Country Withholding Tax Rate -0.2781 0.1048 0.5517 1.1393 1.0122 0.6577 3.1513 2.7043
(1.4100) (1.3565) (1.4292) (1.4784) (0.8211) (0.7593) (0.9240) (0.9864)
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions 0.7600 0.8600 0.7804 0.9036 0.0231 -0.2307 0.0742 -0.1413
(0.5375) (0.5554) (0.5331) (0.5474) (0.2130) (0.1541) (0.2233) (0.1651)
Host Country Trade Openness 0.0036 0.0083 0.0080 0.0144 0.0214 0.0243 0.0307 0.0361
(0.0153) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0170) (0.0120) (0.0076) (0.0126) (0.0082)
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita -1.3475 -1.6205 1.7457 1.1949
(1.1136) (1.1458) (0.7324) (0.6941)
Log of Host Country FDI -0.0588 -0.0566 -0.0222 -0.0176
(0.0565) (0.0549) (0.0404) (0.0368)
Country and Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYYYY
Country Specific Time Trends? YYYYYYYY
No. of Obs. 160                 157                 160                 157                 163                 158                 163                 158                
R-Squared 0.9545 0.9511 0.9548 0.9516 0.9618 0.9715 0.9672 0.9759
Log of Resident Patent Filings Log of Non-Resident Patent Filiings
Table VI
Host Country Patenting Activity and IPR Regime Changes
The dependent variable in the first four specifications is the log of the number of patents filied in a particular country by residents of that country, and the dependent variable in the last four specifications 
in the log of the number of patents filed in a particular country by non-residents.  The Post Reform Dummy is a dummy equal to one in the year of reform and the years following the reforms identified in 
Table II.  The Difference of Host Country Tax Rate and US Tax Rate is the difference between the corporate income tax rate in the host country and the US corporate income tax rate.  The Host Country 
Withholding Tax Rate is the annual median tax rates paid by affiliates in a host country.  Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions is a dummy equal to one when inward FDI restrictions exist, and it is 
drawn from Brune (2001).  Host Country Trade Openness is the index of constant price openness taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  The Log of Host Country GDP per capita is derived 
from data provided in the World Bank World Development Indicators (2003).  All specifications include country fixed effects as well as country specific time trends.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors appear in parentheses.